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When this proscription infringes on the free exercise of religion,
however, the first amendment dictates that the state be made to
demonstrate a compelling interest in such infringement. Since the
question for decision is of federal constitutional proportions, the
test elucidated by the United States Supreme Court should be adhered to. More importantly, as long as a valid constitutional test is
available to fairly and logically weigh conflicting social policies,
common sense requires that it be utilized. North Carolina can constitutionally control the use and possession of peyote. Unfortunately,
the North Carolina court wielded its power to control in a manner
that both ignored the mandate of the Federal Supreme Court, and
eviscerated the first amendment rights of the defendant.
DAVID MONACO

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL FOR
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
Cheff v. Schnackenberg,86 Sup. Ct. 1523 (1966)
The petitioner was held in contempt by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals for failure to obey a court order requiring compliance
with a cease and desist order issued by the Federal Trade Commission.
His demand for a jury trial was denied. After a full hearing by a
three-judge panel he was found guilty and sentenced to six months imprisonment. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court HELD,
sentences for criminal contempt' in federal courts must be limited to
a maximum of six months unless a jury trial is granted or waived.
Judgment affirmed, Black, Douglas, J.J. dissenting.
1. There are two kinds of contempt: civil and criminal. The primary distinction between the two is the purpose of the punishment. In civil contempt the
penalty is remedial in that the accused may terminate the sentence at any time
by obeying the court decree. In criminal contempt cases, however, the sentence is
for a definite length and strictly punitive. Bessette v. IV. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S.
324, 328 (1904). The Court has held that civil contempt may still be tried without
a jury, but the sentence must end when the contemnor has either complied with
the court order or circumstances arise so that it is no longer possible for him to
comply. Shillitani v. United States, 86 Sup. Ct. 1531 (1966). See generally Note,
Criminal Contempt Procedure in Florida- Proposals, 18 U. FLA. L. RFV. 78 (1965),

for a discussion of the treatment of criminal contempt in Florida.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 10
1966]

CASE COMMENTS

Prior to the instant decision, it was settled that no right to a jury
trial existed for one charged with criminal contempt. 2 Summary trial
of contempt at common law was considered to be of "immemorial
usage" 3 and the Judiciary Act of 1789, 4 which gave the courts of the
United States a discretionary power to punish for "all contempts of
authority," was held to be declaratory of the common law. 5 Contempts were not "crimes" 6 or "criminal prosecutions" 7 and were not
within the contemplated range of the jury provisions of the Constitution8 The underlying assumption was that the power to try
contemnors without a jury is inherent and necessary to enforce compliance with orders and judgments, 9 as well as, to preserve the dignity
of the court.' 0 Much doubt has been cast on this assumption" but
12
the Court has refused to reopen the historical argument.
The proceeding has been classed as sui generis, possessing the
qualities of both criminal and civil wrongs. 3 The courts have thus
kept the procedure flexible while extending many rights of a criminal
prosecution to an accused.' 4 In United States v. Barnett5 the Court
affirmed prior holdings but indicated that the severity of the penalty
2.

United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 695 & n. 12 (1964).
(1899).
4. 1 Stat. 83.
5. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 687 (1964).
6. "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed ....
" U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.
7. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed .... "U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
8. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 184 (1958); Myers v. United
States, 264 U.S. 95, 105 (1924); Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134- U.S. 31, 38
3.

4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 283

(1889).
9. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 698 (1964), quoting from Eilenbecker
v. District Court, supra note 8, at 36.
10. Ibid.
11. See generally Fox, CONTEMpr oF COURT (1927); Frankfurter 8c Landis,
Power To Regulate Contempts, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1010 (1924); Nelles, The Summary Power To Punish for Contempt, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 956 (1931).
12. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
13. See, e.g., Green v. United States, note 12 supra; In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257 (1948); Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924); Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S.
324 (1904).
14. See, e.g., In re Oliver, note 13 supra; Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517
(1925) (right to counsel, compulsory process for witnesses, right to cross-examine
witness, right to reasonable notice of the charge, right to a public trial); Gompers
v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914) (benefit of statute of limitations generally
governing crimes); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., note 13 supra (proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and freedom from compulsion to testify).
15. 376 U.S. 681, 695 n.12 (1964).
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might entitle a contemnor to a jury trial. The Barnett dictum was
derived from an earlier case which held that the nature of the penalty
must be weighed in determining whether an offense "in other respects
trivial and not a crime at common law, must be deemed so serious
as to be comparable with common law crimes, and thus to entitle the
accused to the benefit of a jury .... 16
At the time of the creation of the Constitution there were numerous petty criminal offenses to which the right to a jury trial did
not attach.17 The Court in the instant case, relying on the Barnett
dictum, concluded that the proceeding to try criminal contempt is to
be viewed as equivalent to the procedure for petty offenses. The procedure for determining whether an offense is petty has been to consider both the quality of the offense' and the severity of the penalty. 19
The instant case applied this two-fold test to criminal contempt and
concluded: (1) that the quality of the offense did not warrant a
jury trial as a matter of right 2° and (2) that the penalty for a petty
offense as defined by federal law 21 is imprisonment not exceeding six
months. Therefore, the Court reasoned that if the penalty for criminal
contempt would exceed six months imprisonment, the right to jury
trial would attach. Cheff's conviction was affirmed, however, because
his sentence did not exceed six months.
The instant case is unique in that it glosses over the precedent of
22
one hundred and fifty years of summary trial of criminal contempt
to carve an exception based upon the petty offense theory. The Court,
however, did not strictly adhere to precedent 23 in determining whether
16. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937).
17. See, e.g., Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509 (1848); Wilmarth v. King, 74
N.H. 512, 69 At. 889 (1908); State v. Griffin, 66 N.H. 326, 29 At. 414 (1890). From
an historical analysis, Frankfurter and Corcoran concluded: "[T]he framers did
not mean to provide for jury trials in criminal cases under the new government
beyond the established practice in their various states." Petty Offenses and the
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REv. 917, 969 (1920). But
see Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers, 26 U. Ci. L. REV. 245 (1959).
18. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
19. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
20. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 86 Sup. Ct. 1523, 1526 (1966); see Myers v. United
States, 264 U.S. 95, 105 (1924).
21. 18 U.S.C. §1 (1964).
22. In Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183 n.14 (1958), the Court emphatically said: "[T]he statements of this Court in a long and unbroken line of
decisions involving contempts ranging from misbehavior in court to disobedience
of court orders establish beyond peradventure that criminal contempts are not
subject to jury trials as a matter of constitutional right."
23. Indeed, the precedent concerning petty offenses is none too clear. The
first case, Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888), focused only upon the qualitative
seriousness of conspiracy. The next important case so often cited as authority for
the "severity of the penalty" test was Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904);
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an offense is petty. Rather than considering the quality of the defendant's conduct,24 the Court concluded that criminal contempt per
se did not entitle one to a trial by jury. Therefore, the Court's primary concern was with the severity of the penalty. 25 Further, the
instant case judged the severity of the penalty by the sentence actually
imposed. The traditional test had been to consider the maximum
potential sentence.

26

The decision probably will not mark a new trend in the test for
petty offenses, however, because the approach was necessitated by the

peculiar nature of contempt. Unlike most offenses, there is no statu27
tory limit to the penalty that may be imposed for criminal contempt.
Furthermore, it would not be an easy task for the Court to distinguish
the degrees of qualitative seriousness2s when contempts display a
myriad of forms.29 By refusing to consider the seriousness of various

but Schick seems more concerned with whether it is permissible to allow the
defendant to waive a jury trial. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930),
was concerned with the nature of the offense. Seven years later District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937), considered only the penalty.
24. In District of Columbia v. Colts, note 23 supra, the Court considered only
the qualitative seriousness of the offense. Even though the penalty for reckless
driving was mild, the Court found it to be an offense malum in se and thus the
defendant had a right to a jury trial.
25. Cheff v. Schenackenberg, 86 Sup. Ct. 1523, 1528 (1966). Sole reliance upon
18 U.S.C. §1 (1964) is also not supported by precedent. In the last case to use
the "severity of the penalty" test for a petty offense, District of Columbia v. Clawans,
300 U.S. 617, 630 (1937), no reference was made to the statutory classification of
petty offenses available in the Code. Instead, the Court asked if the potential
penalty offended a contemporary "public sense of propriety and fairness."
26. In District of Columbia v. Clawans, note 25 supra, the defendant was
convicted, without a jury trial, of engaging in business without a license and
was punished by sixty days in jail or a fine of $300. In affirming the conviction,
the Court held that the test for a petty offense consists of the following questions:
(1) Was the offense indictable at common law? (2) Was the potential penalty
considered severe at common law? (3) And more especially, is the maximum
potential penalty today considered to be so harsh as to require a jury trial?
27. 18 U.S.C. §§401-02 (1964) leave the maximum potential penalty for criminal
contempt to the court's discretion.
28. In District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930), the Court held
that reckless driving was an offense of "[S]uch obvious depravity that to characterize it as a petty offense would be to shock the general moral sense." But in
recent years the Court has avoided the ambiguous test of "shocking the conscience,"
see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), in favor of more objective constitutional standards, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Similarly it has been shown
with much justification that the malum in se/malum prohibitum distinction is
difficult to apply to criminal law with the precision required by due process. See
Note, The Distinction Between Mala Prohibita and Mala in Se in Criminal Law,
30 COLuM. L. REv. 74 (1930).
29. The dissenters argue that as long as all contempts are lumped together,
all contempts must be considered serious and thus all should be triable by jury
as a matter of right. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 86 Sup. Ct. 1523, 1530 (1966).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol19/iss2/10

4

McKey and Sherrill: Constituitonal Law: The Right to Jury Trial for Criminal Contempt
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

kinds of criminal contempt and by adhering to statutory penalty
classifications the Court avoided a difficult area 30 that is perhaps more
properly a realm for legislative action.31 In certain limited areas of
contempt Congress has provided by statute a mandatory right to a
jury trial.32 One of these, the Clayton Act, 33 was held to be constitu-

tional although it presented the problem of a conflict of legislative
3 4

and judicial powers.

The present decision is inapplicable to the states because it is
merely a supervisory rule and not a constitutional mandate. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that the fourteenth amendment
does not require states to retain the right to a jury trial in criminal
35

prosecutions.

A jury trial in federal courts will provide a cushion of community
values between the accused and the broad discretionary power of the
judge.36 In cases of more serious criminal contempts, which involve
a possibility of greater penalties, the speed and convenience of a
summary trial become justly subordinated to the individual's right
to have a jury pass upon his guilt37 One serious procedural problem,
however, is created by the decision. By conditioning the right to a
30. For the Court to attempt to classify contempts would be "faintly reminiscent of declaring 'common-law crimes,' a power which has been denied the federal
judiciary since the beginning of our republic." Cheff v. Schnackenberg, supra note
29, at 1530; see United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917).
31. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 189 (1958) (separate opinion).
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42 (b) provides that in criminal contempt "the defendant
is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress provides."
Several contempt statutes have so provided: e.g., the Clayton Act (antitrust act),
(1914), 18 U.S.C. §3691 (1964); the Norris-LaGuardia Act (labor disputes), 18
U.S.C. §3692 (1964); the Civil Rights Act of 1957, §151, 71 Stat. 638 (1957), 42
U.S.C. §1995 (1964); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §1101, 78 Stat. 268 (1964), 42
U.S.C. §2000h (1964).
33. 18 U.S.C. §3691 (1964).
34. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924). Congress perhaps may not
limit the Supreme Court's contempt authority but it can limit the power of lower
federal courts to deal with contempt without a jury. Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co.,
194 U.S. 324, 327 (1904); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873).
35. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721 (1961); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261
(1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). In Fay v. New York, supra at
288, the Court held "[C]ondemnation shall be rendered only after a trial, in
which the hearing is a real one, not sham or pretense ....
Trial must be before
a tribunal not biased by interest in the event." Thus, due process may someday
require that state courts grant a jury trial in contempt proceedings on the
grounds that trial by the offended judge is trial by a tribunal biased by interest
in the event.
36. See Goldfarb, The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 MICH. L. REv.
283, 290 (1962).
37. See Kaye, supra note 17, at 268-70. Indeed, in cases when the act of contempt was initiated several years prior to trial there is no great necessity for
speed. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
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jury upon the length of the sentence imposed, the trial judge is forced
to grant or deny a jury trial without knowledge of the facts that
should determine the sentence. This will not result in the kind of
certainty in criminal law that due process seems to guarantee, 38 nor is
it consistent with the fundamental nature of the accusatorial process.3 9
Indeed, in cases in which the sentence is less than six months, the
contemnor may be in danger of greater injustice than prior to the
present decision. The judge who conducts the summary trial will be
the same judge who has already considered guilt and established a
probable penalty. 40
Because the penalty is within the court's discretion, the judge
will still have great leeway in denying a jury trial for criminal contempt. In close cases, the judge will probably give fewer penalties over
six months imprisonment. Thus, a silent but important purpose of
the principal decision (to restrain lower federal courts from imposing
severe sentences) 41 will be indirectly accomplished. In his concurring
opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan warned that limiting the penalty for
criminal contempt, not tried by a jury, to six-months imprisonment
42
It
may preclude implementation of "locally unpopular decrees."
would appear, however, that a six-months sentence would adequately
effectuate this purpose and should be sufficient to preserve the dignity,
order, and authority of the judiciary.
Criminal contempt remains an unsettled area. The Supreme Court
has consistently rejected constitutional arguments seeking to lessen
judicial discretion over a contemnor, but has demonstrated a willingness to mitigate the harsher aspects of its contempt power. The
immediate result of the present decision probably will be a decrease
in the number of criminal contempt sentences exceeding six months.
38. Cf., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
39. Cf., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
40. Cf., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294 (1947).
41. The interest in the severity of the penalty imposed in the instant decision
seems to stem at least in part from the dissent of Mr. Justice Goldberg in United
States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 728 (1964), which demonstrated great concern for
the length of imprisonment terms imposed for contempt in recent years. See, e.g.,
Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556 (1961) (18 months); Reina v. United
States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960) (two years); Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1958)
(15 months); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) (3 years). Mr Justice
Goldberg felt that criminal contempts were "tried without a jury at the time of
the Constitution . . . because they were deemed a species of petty offense

punishable by trivial penalties." United States v. Barnett, supra at 751-52. However,
Mr. Justice Goldberg's historical analysis has been somewhat discredited. See
generally Tefft, United States v. Barnett, "'Twas a Famous Victory," Sup. CT. Rv.
123 (1964). Nor has the Court adopted the argument. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 86
Sup. Ct. 1523 (1966).

42. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, supra note 41, at 1538.
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